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The contingent features of our world amaze us. As Peter unger has 
indicated, this happens most profoundly when we notice the contingent 
aspects of the fundamental physical reality. For example, the speed of 
light in a vacuum is about 299,792,458 meters per second. However, are 
there any at least logically possible worlds where the speed of light in 
a vacuum is a bit faster or slower? If there are some, then the actual speed 
of light is contingent. This consideration poses questions. Why is the 
speed of light this value? What makes this contingent state of affairs the 
case? This question can be generalized. Why do the particular contingent 
states of affairs obtain? The central aim of Timothy o’Connor’s Theism 
and Ultimate Explanation is to provide an answer to this question.
This book is divided into three parts. An outline of each part is 
provided below. (This is only an outline, as I shall stress below.)
The first part discusses the general topics of modality. Its main claim 
is that we should commit ourselves to substantial modal truths in order 
to explain the world. To defend this view, o’Connor responds to the 
challenges posed by the sceptics about modal truths, both negatively 
and positively. Negatively, he criticizes several types of philosophers who 
intend to do without substantial modal notions, for example, Quinean 
eliminativists and lewisian reductionists. Positively, he attempts to 
construct a theory of modal knowledge that would convince the sceptics 
that we can reach justified beliefs about modal truths. The positive task 
of modal epistemology will be completed at the end of the next part.
The second part tackles the main problem of this book: Why do 
particular contingencies exist? o’Connor calls a possible answer to this 
fundamental question ‘an ultimate explanation’. He tries to give us the 
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true ultimate explanation in two steps. I will sum up the central claims, 
omitting the rationales. (I will come back to the arguments later.) The 
first step, which he calls ‘The existence Stage’, suggests that the formally 
adequate explanation must posit a  necessary being as the ground of 
the contingencies, and that the personal-creator model of a  necessary 
being is coherent. This stage claims that the true explanation requires 
the existence of some necessary being, which might be a  personal 
agent, without saying what exactly this being is. The second step, which 
o’Connor calls ‘The Identification Stage’, argues that the necessary being 
is not immanent to the world but transcendent, and that its way of 
creating reality is not chaotic but well-planned. This stage concludes that 
the necessary being is transcendent Logos, that is, God.
The ultimate explanation that involves God solves the problem of 
modal knowledge, argues o’Connor. The problem concerns the way 
to modal knowledge. If we admit, along with o’Connor, that there are 
objective modal truths, then we should explain how we access such 
truths. This question should be answered by everyone who commits to 
substantial modal truths. Now, if there is a God (i.e. the rational creator 
of all reality), then we can be given a possible answer: In designing and 
making the universe, God ensures that we correctly think about modal 
relationships. on the contrary, if, for example, the ultimate ground of the 
reality is not Logos but Chaos, it will be doubted whether such a chaotic 
‘creator’ can bridge the gap between the range of our cognitive capacity 
and the objective structure of modality. Is there any way to explain our 
having modal knowledge without drawing on God? This is o’Connor’s 
point. In this book, he proposes as a  possible answer to the question 
about modal knowledge ‘that it is a divine intention that human cognitive 
abilities are disposed to modalize reliably in accordance with modal fact’, 
and adds the following: ‘our typical naturalist will be scandalized at this 
leibnizian solution, but can he do any better?’ (p. 129)
The third part is meta-theoretical. It reflects on the relationship 
between philosophy and theology. While this book eventually identifies 
the necessary being with God, several theologians will oppose such 
identification by rejecting the necessary-being conception of God as 
a mere God of philosophers. The orthodox revealed theologians would 
claim that the abstract conception of God as necessary being is just 
aping Hellenistic intellectual (possibly, over-intellectual) fashion, and 
that it has no essential connection with the Christian tradition. However, 
according to o’Connor, this is a rather simplified and probably distorted 
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understanding of the relationship between the content of Christian 
revelation and the role of philosophical or natural theology. He argues 
that even the typical revealed theologians, whom he calls ‘de-Hellenizers’, 
are, malgré leurs, doing a  bit of natural theology. His reason is that, 
because the revealed characterizations of God (e.g., God is the lord, the 
absolute sovereign), ontologically imply that He necessarily exists, (for, 
if in some world He didn’t exist, He would not be the governor of that 
world) the revelation theologians also need the philosophical conception 
of a  necessary being in order to fully understand what God the lord 
is. Warning against the recent overreaction to the research program 
of philosophical theology, o’Connor concludes that philosophical 
reflection is beneficial to the theological understanding of God.
because this is only an outline, I have skipped over several significant 
points. However, I suppose that what is very interesting in this book lies 
in its articulated way of supporting the central claims. Therefore, the 
details of o’Connor’s arguments are worth considering, whether or not 
you agree with o’Connor’s conclusions summed up above.
I conclude my review with two comments on the main part of this 
book.
Why might the necessary being, who is required to ground the 
contingent reality, be a personal agent? Further, a  fortiori, why would 
it be better if the necessary being was a  personal agent, as o’Connor 
argues? His reason in this book is as follows. If we admit that a necessary 
being that is the basis of all reality exists, we will be additionally required 
to avoid the ‘absurd conclusion’ that there are no contingencies (p. 79). 
If ‘grounding’ means ‘necessitating’ as the ordinary understanding 
of the word seems to suggest, the necessary ground of the world does 
not exclude any contingent feature of reality. Therefore, we should find 
a  ‘tricky’ explanatory framework such that the necessary being does 
not necessitate, but does ground, all the contingent states of affairs. 
That is, if you like to say, ‘search for a narrow middle way’. one such 
framework is the personal-creator model. In this model, the necessary 
being freely creates reality in the libertarian sense. In this case, all the 
contingencies are sufficiently grounded, but not necessitated. Although 
the libertarian conception of agency is relatively mysterious, o’Connor’s 
solution seems to be one of the best, because I have been unable to find 
any other ‘trick’ to go the middle way that does not draw on the likes of 
a libertarian agency. However, I doubt whether we should go the middle 
way. Certainly, it feels counter-intuitive that there are no contingencies. 
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but, is it inconsistent to say that the apparently contingent states of affairs 
are, in reality, only apparent? The counter-intuitiveness of this view does 
not imply that it is wrong. o’Connor did not justify the requirement 
that we should avoid the above-mentioned ‘absurd’ conclusion that 
there are no contingencies. Therefore, his remaining task is to clarify the 
motivation for seeking the middle way.
In what sense is the necessary being necessary? ordinarily, modalities 
are analyzed in terms of quantifications over worlds. o’Connor himself 
mentions this analysis (p. 70). However, it is not obvious that the neces-
sity of o’Connor’s necessary being can be explained in the ordinary 
way, because the necessary being is not immanent to any world, but 
transcendent. Probably, the modal status of an entity can only be analyzed 
in the possible-world framework when the entity exists inside the worlds. 
Therefore, I believe that o’Connor cannot say that the necessary being 
is necessary because it exists in every world. Perhaps o’Connor might 
realize this subtle point because, with regard to the necessary being, he 
says that it ‘exists necessarily a se (of itself, rather than having its necessity 
rest in connection to something else that necessarily exists)’ (p. 128). 
However, he does not give a more detailed analysis on the notion of ‘a se 
necessity’. Therefore, a consideration concerning the modal status of the 
necessary being itself might be needed.
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Personal Identity and Resurrection offers thoughtful and critical solutions 
to the problem of personal survival after somatic death. The authors, who 
participated in the university of Innsbruck 2008 summer conference, 
rigorously engage in ways to make sense of the conjunction of both 
personal identity and persistence from somatic death, the possible 
intermediate state, and the physical resurrection. Yet it offers more than 
a  defense of survival in Christian philosophy of religion and moves 
beyond the foundations to construct theology. Thus, a careful, yet dense, 
treatment contributes to the discussion and provides many avenues 
worthy of further research.
